Saudi Arabia 28 Pages

28 Pages: 9/11 Smoke Lingers

Written By Gary J. Hudach

The 9/11 Commission Chairmen recently expressed their views on the “28 pages” being considered for release. Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton called the pages “no smoking gun”. They explained that the redacted 28 pages from the 2002 Congressional Inquiry were based on raw, unvetted material. They said the material was written up to provide possible leads for further investigation.

In referring to the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, Kean and Hamilton said “There were leads and we investigated”. They also said “9/11 Commission members and relevant staff were given access to the 28 pages”. They said the Commission “found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded al-Qaeda.”

On May 1, 2016, CIA Director John Brennan appeared on “Meet the Press”. He said “I think the 9/11 Commission took that joint inquiry, and those 28 pages or so, and followed through on the investigation. And they came out with a very clear judgment that there was no evidence that indicated that the Saudi government as an institution, or Saudi officials individually, had provided financial support to Al Qaeda.”

They were all repeating almost word for word the conclusion on page 171 of the 9/11 Commission report. That’s the official story, but it’s not the complete story. Kean, Hamilton and Brennan tell a story that’s missing a few details. Some family members of the victims know the details, but most Americans do not. And whether or not there is a smoking gun depends on those details.

The 2008 book, “The Commission” by Philip Shenon, tells a more complete story.   

Two 9/11 Commission investigators, Dana Lesemann and Mike Jacobson, had been on the staff of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry. They were committed to investigating the possible leads in the 28 pages. One of the leads suggested two of the hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, were linked to a Saudi government official.

Lesemann and Jacobson requested twenty interviews, but 9/11 Commission executive director Philip Zelikow would only agree to ten interviews. He said he didn’t want to overwhelm federal agencies with interview requests at that time. Many staff members felt that Zelikow’s reasoning was preposterous. Lesemann’s response to Zelikow was: “Philip, this is ridiculous. We need the interviews. We need these documents. Why are you trying to limit our investigation?”

Lesemann requested access to the 28 pages. She needed them to do her job.

Zelikow declined her request. After being refused access for weeks, she finally obtained a copy and read the 28 pages without his consent. When he found out, he fired her within hours. He fired her for reading the pages even though she had security clearance. The firing of Lesemann was not leaked to the press or Congress when it occurred.

Kean and Hamilton said the 28 pages were investigated by Dietrich Snell, Philip Zelikow and the original drafter. Snell was a prosecutor, known for being overly cautious. They didn’t name the original drafter, but they were referring to Mike Jacobson, who worked with Dana Lesemann. He had been following up on the leads he wrote up in the original 28 pages.

Kean and Hamilton failed to mention that Jacobson and another investigator, Raj De, concluded that the evidence in the 28 pages concerning Saudi officials was explosive. They wrote a draft of their findings that was to be included in the 9/11 Commission report. Snell and Zelikow rewrote it, removing any allegations against the Saudis that might be deemed serious. Their revisions were made only days before the entire 9/11 Commission report was due at the printers.

The 28 pages were originally redacted from the Congressional Inquiry at the direction of President Bush. Philip Zelikow served on Bush’s transition team and co-authored a book with Condoleezza Rice before being named 9/11 Commission director.

Kean and Hamilton were right when they said that the 28 pages were investigated, but the final report was written by a prosecutor and Philip Zelikow, not the investigator who followed up on his own leads.

The conclusion that there is “no smoking gun” was not a conclusion reached by Mike Jacobson and Raj De. We’ll never know what Dana Lesemann’s conclusion would have been. She was fired before she could give an opinion.